When the Law Is Clear and Unambiguous

Beecham v. United States, 511 U.S. 368, 371 (1994). The Court often asserts that this and similar canon are merely a means of determining the correct meaning of otherwise ambiguous terms. See Norfolk & Western Ry. v. Train Dispatchers, 499 U.S. 117, 129 (1991) (« The Cannon does not control. if the whole context dictates a different conclusion. »); United States v.

Turkette, 452 U.S. 576, 580-82 (1981) (Court of Appeals erred in holding that a second category was merely a more general description of the first; Instead, context and language show two opposing categories). For example, in Astoria Federal Savings & Loan Assn. v. Solimino (501 U.S. 104 (1991)), the Court considered whether a federal case of action under the age law was bound by unconsidered findings of a state board of directors, which could be the case if the common law doctrine of ancillary forfeiture were applied. In this case, Souter J. characterized the maxim that judicial law implicitly continues to be viewed only as an analytical starting point, which would yield depending on the legal context or purpose.

The notice avoided any formal application that would make the maxim determinative, without a « clear statement » in the law to the contrary. 501 U.S. at 108-10. Although immunity cases most often seek to determine whether a sovereign`s right to immunity has been waived, in some cases the question is whether a sovereign State has extended immunity to sub-State or private entities. The issue arises, inter alia, of antitrust law when a political sub-entity or a private entity claims that the State has granted it immunity from antitrust law in order to participate in certain anti-competitive practices. To successfully invoke immunity in these circumstances, it must be shown that the extension of immunity was the foreseeable result of clearly articulated and affirmatively expressed legal language.146 See, for example, Frank B. Cross, The Significance of Statutory Interpretive Methodologies, 82 Notre Dame L. Rev. 1971 (2007). Although the Court is uniform and its opinion relatively brief, it generally bases its interpretation on a number of mutually reinforcing grounds.

For example, Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S. 233 (2010). For example, Bowen v. Michigan Academy of Family Physicians, 476 U.S. 667, 671 (1986) (« This standard [`clear and convincing evidence`] has been used repeatedly. »); Kucana v. Holder, 558 U.S.233, 251-52 (2010). Occasionally, the court compares the interpretation of a part of a particular language to a language that expresses the same concept more clearly and directly. There are cases — for example, the non-use of certain artistic terms — where this argument can be very persuasive. Great Northern Ry., 287 U.S. 144 (1932).

On the other hand: « We do not use legislative history to tarnish a legislative text that is clear. » Ratzlaf v. United States, 510 U.S. 135, 147-48 (1994). It is a consistent principle of interpretation that the Court cannot add or delete words from a statute. If the wording of a statute is absolutely clear and unambiguous, the principles of interpretation cannot be used, except for the literal rule, see Swedish Match AB and Another vs. Securities and Exchange Board, India and Another,. As stated in Prakash Nath Khanna and Another vs. Commissioner of Income Tax and Another, the language used in a statute is the determining factor in the intent of Parliament. It is presumed that Parliament did not err. The assumption is that she meant what she said. Assuming that there is a defect or omission in the terms employed by the legislature, the Court cannot correct or compensate for that deficiency, especially if a literal interpretation leads to an intelligible result (see Delhi Fin). Corpn.

and another against Rajiv Anand and others. If Parliament`s intent is clear from the wording, the Court should implement it, see Government of A.P. and Another vs. Road Rollers Owners Welfare Association and Others, Connecticut Nat`l Bank v. Germain, 503 U.S. 249, 253-54 (1992) (citations omitted). A canon of interpretation should not be followed « if the application would amount to a formalistic disregard for the intentions of Congress. » Reis v. Rehner, 463 U.S. 713, 732 (1983). Watt v. Alaska, 451 U.S.

259, 267 (1981). See also Lewis v. Lewis & Clark Marine, Inc., 531 U.S. 438 (2001) (balancing the « tension » between the gratuitous safeguard clause and the limitation of liability law); Ruckelshaus v. Monsanto Co., 467 U.S. 986, 1017-18 (1984) (rejecting the allegation that the federal Insecticides, Fungicides, and Rodenticides Act implicitly repealed a Tucker Act remedy for government expropriation of property without fair compensation, and reconciling the two laws by requiring that FIFRA`s remedies be exhausted before Tucker redress could be obtained). But see Stewart v. Smith, 673 F.2d 485, 492 (D.C. Cir. 1982) (interpretation of legislation authorizing heads of agencies to set maximum age limits for law enforcement officers as an exception to the Employment Age Discrimination Act). Although the laws could be harmonized through « tense reading, » the court concluded that this would defeat the spirit and purpose of the maximum age law. The Stewart Court relied on legislative history to conclude that Congress « clearly intended » to « use a maximum age of entry as a means of ensuring a `young and vigorous` workforce of law enforcement officers, » concluding that the promotion of this policy « requires consideration of factors not normally taken into account » in ADEA`s proceedings.

There may, of course, be disagreements about when it is « possible » to give effect to any legal language—that is, to seek to distinguish between similar terms or apparently redundant language without distorting the meaning of those distinctions—and when the general rule should give way to a more « reasonable » interpretation.88 Gozlon-Peretz v. United States, 498 U.S. 395, 404 (1991). Normally, and in the absence of special circumstances, the law does not recognize fractions of days, so a law takes effect « from the first moment » of its coming into force. Lapeyre v. United States, 17 Wall. 191, 198 (1872). However, « whenever it becomes important for the purposes of justice. » The law will investigate in fractions of a day.

Louisville v. Savings Bank, 104 U.S. 469, 474 (1881). See Burgess v. Salmon, 97 U.S. 381 (1878) (a law signed in the afternoon could not be used to punish a person for acts he had performed on the morning of the same day); United States v. Will, 449 U.S. 200, 225 n.29 (1980) (a salary increase for judges had taken effect earlier in the day and was already in effect when the President signed a bill reducing the increase in the cost of living later that day).

The most common link between the text and the legislative history is the observation that the language of the law is not simple, but unclear or « ambiguous. » 303 However, substantial differences appear in the courts` intention to classify certain legislative texts as `ambiguous` and thus to refer to the legislative history. Some judges are more confident than others in their ability to interpret legal texts without resorting to the « extrinsic » help of legislative history.304 Some judges limit themselves to focusing on the clarity or ambiguity of a particular legal expression, while others examine the broader legal context to better understand formulations that may appear ambiguous in isolation.305 And, Inevitably, tensions can arise between seemingly clear speech and perceived intent.306 « It is a cardinal principle of statutory interpretation that the words of a statute must be understood in their natural, ordinary, or popular sense and interpreted in their grammatical sense, unless such interpretation would lead to absurdity or there is something in the context or purpose of the law, which suggests otherwise.

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